display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Duhem and Quine have maintained that it may be possible to develop two or more theories that are 1) internally consistent, 2) inconsistent with one another, and 3) perfectly consistent with all the data we can muster. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by J Baggini / PS Fosl - The Philosopher's Toolkit §1.06 | |
| A reaction: Obviously this may be a contingent truth about our theories, but why not presume that this is because we are unable to collect the crucial data (e.g. about prehistoric biology), rather than denigrate the whole concept of a theory, and undermine science? |
| 16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Induction is always a leap beyond the known, but we are constantly assured by later experience that we have landed safely. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: Not philosophically very interesting, but a nice remark for capturing the lived aspect of inductive thought, as practised by the humblest of animals. |
| 16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: A law ought to be capable of playing some role in explaining the phenomena that are governed by or are manifestations of it. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: I find this attitude bewildering. 'Why do electrons have spin?' 'Because they all do!' The word 'governed' is the clue. What on earth is a law, if it can 'govern' nature? What is its ontological status? Natures of things are basic, not 'laws'. |