display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E). | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41) |
| 2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42) |
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| Full Idea: Scientific practices such as prediction and explanation regarding causal phenomena are concerned not merely with kinds having essences, but also with kinds lacking them. | |
| From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: Not quite clear what he has in mind, but explanation should certainly involve a coherent picture, and not just the citation of some underlying causal mechanism. |