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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philebus' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics'

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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

17943	Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan]
	Full Idea: Those who see probabilities as ratios of frequencies can't use Bayes's Theorem if there is no objective prior probability. Those who accept prior probabilities tend to opt for a subjectivist account, where probabilities are degrees of belief.
	From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 9.1.8)
	A reaction: [compressed]