display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
Full Idea: I hold that characteristic theoretical identifications like 'heat is the motion of molecules', are not contingent truths but necessary truths, and I don't just mean physically necessary, but necessary in the highest degree. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2) | |
A reaction: This helps to keep epistemology and ontology separate. The contingency was in the epistemology. That the identity is 'physically necessary' seems obvious; that it is necessary 'in the highest degrees' implies an essentialist view of nature. |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Not all explanations are causal. We can explain some things by showing what follows logically from what, or what is required by the definition of a term, or in terms of purpose. | |
From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Limits') | |
A reaction: Would these fully qualify as 'explanations'? You don't explain the sea by saying that 'wet' is part of its definition. |