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| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status). | |
| From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4) | |
| A reaction: This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view). |