Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Perception', 'Potentiality' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Any search for an explanation presupposes that there is something in need of an explanation - that is, something which is improbable unless explained.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: Elementary enough, but it underlines the human perspective of all explanations. I may need an explanation of baseball, where you don't.
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The fact that order requires an explanation seems to be an a priori principle; ..we assume all possibilities are equally likely, and so no striking regularities should emerge; the sceptic replies that a highly ordered sequence is as likely as any other.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: An independent notion of 'order' is required. If I write down '14356', and then throw 1 4 3 5 6 on a die, the match is the order; instrinsically 14356 is nothing special. If you threw the die a million times, a run of six sixes seems quite likely.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter]
     Full Idea: Patterns of behaviour may be explained by circumstances external to the individual, but dispositional explanations, based on the instrinsic make-up of individuals are typically more reliable and stable.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 3.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is very nice support for the view I have been defending. She doesn't deal in essences, and prefers 'potentialities' (as broader) to 'dispositions'. The point is to explain events by the natures of the ingredients.
Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter]
     Full Idea: Grounding is a kind of explanation - and specifically, the kind of metaphysical explanation that metaphysicians are after.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.5)
     A reaction: Depending on how you interpret 'grounding', it is plausible that it is the sort of explanation that physicists and economists are after as well. If the aim is to understand the structure of everything, the target is to know what grounds what.