Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Ethics' and 'Getting Causes from Powers'

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3 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: It is tempting to think that entailment is the only adequate kind of explanation because of the idea that if A does not entail B, it must have fallen short of (fully) explaining it.
     From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.5)
     A reaction: Yes. One might dream of saying 'this, and only this, necessitates what happened', but it is doubtful whether causes necessitate effects. It is a quirky view to think that every car accident is necessitated. Nuclear explosions block most events.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Adequate understanding of a phenomenon, for Spinoza, involves a complete understanding of its causes, and this in turn involves a dissolving of the illusion of contingency and a recognition of the necessity of its being thus and not otherwise.
     From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.168
     A reaction: This is the appeal of the rationalist dream. We want a god-like grasp of things, not a superficial perception of what seems to be going on.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: Knowing the structure that something has does not in itself causally explain that thing's behaviour unless we also know what sorts of behaviour a thing of that structure can cause.
     From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.2)
     A reaction: I agree with this. If you focus on the lowest possible levels of causal explanation, I can see only powers. Whatever you come up with, it had better be something active. Geometry never started any bonfires.