display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Emeralds cannot all turn blue in 2050 (as Nelson Goodman envisaged), because to do so they would have to have an extrinsically variable nature. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I was never very impressed by the 'grue' problem, probably for this reason, but also because Goodman probably thought predicates and properties are the same thing, which they aren't (Idea 5457). |
5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis] |
Full Idea: For essentialists the problem of induction reduces to discovering what natural kinds there are, and identifying their essential problems and structures. We then know how they must behave in any world, and there is no inference from some to all. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is how you would determine the essences if you are not allowed to infer 'from some to all'. Personally I don't see induction as a problem, because it is self-evidently rational in a stable world. Hume was right to recommend caution. |