display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
Full Idea: Experiments differ from observational studies in that experiments usually involve intervening in some way in the natural order to see if altering something about that order causes a change in the response of that order. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: Not convinced by this. Lots of experiments isolate a natural process, rather than 'intervening'. Chemists constantly purify substances. Particle accelerators pick out things to accelerate. Does 'intervening' in nature even make sense? |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
Full Idea: Three assumptions needed for the emergence of science are central to medieval thought: that the natural order is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that nature is de-animated, and that it is worthy of study. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: A very illuminating and convincing observation. Why did Europe produce major science? The answer is likely to be found in Christianity. |
8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
Full Idea: Induction depends on the general proposition that the inductive method can establish the truth of a law, or the probability for it. If we deny this, induction becomes nothing more than a psychological phenomenon. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03 n) | |
A reaction: The problem is that we can't seem to 'establish' the requisite proposition, even for probability, since probability is in part subjective. I think induction needs the premiss that nature has underlying uniformity, which we then tease out by observation. |
8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
Full Idea: The procedure of the sciences, with its objective standards, will at times find a high probability established by a single confirmatory instance, while at others it will dismiss a thousand as almost worthless. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §10) | |
A reaction: This thought is presumably what pushes theorists away from traditional induction and towards Bayes's Theorem (Idea 2798). The remark is a great difficulty for anyone trying to defend traditional induction. |