15293
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If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Natural necessity involves causal directionality as an essential element, while entailment as a purely logical relation does not.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V)
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A reaction:
If there is a naturally necessary relation between an eclipse and its cause, the directionality of that doesn't seem to arise from the mutual relation between the two. You have to add time's arrow, or causation's arrow.
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15294
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Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The concept of power can be used to explain the temporal directionality of the concept of causality, and, at the same time, makes that causality a genuine case of natural necessity.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V)
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A reaction:
I'm not sure that powers actually 'explain' causal direction. It seems more like transferring the directionality from the process to its source. You are still left with brute directionality.
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15254
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If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
If we see that certain powers and capacities are explained by the nature of certain particulars and are necessarily attendant upon them, then we have an explanation of why certain things must go together and happen as they do.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I)
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A reaction:
They are offering this as an account of induction, as well as of explanation, and it is a nice summary of the account which I take to be correct.
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15310
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Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Solidity is the effect of a power of repulsion between whole things, and shape is the effect of a power of attraction between parts of whole things.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.II.B)
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A reaction:
This sounds a bit too neat in its division, but it shows nicely how a metaphysics with powers can deal with categorical properties. The question, remains, though of what is doing the repelling and attracting. Fields, they say.
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