display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers of science have distinguished between 'simple induction' - the argument from observed Fs to all Fs - and the argument to hidden or theoretical entities (Peirce's 'abduction'). | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
A reaction: 'Abduction' is (roughly) the same is inference to the best explanation, of which I am a great fan. |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is plausible to say, on the basis of total science, that 'grue' is a predicate to which no genuine, that is, unitary, universal corresponds. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The predicate 'grue' involves essential reference to a particular time, which 'green' does not. Also on the 'grue' hypothesis a change occurs in emeralds in a way that change does not occur on the 'green' hypothesis. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.5) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to think that comparing 'grue' with 'green' is a category mistake. 'Grue' is a behaviour. Armstrong says this is no objection, because Goodman's argument is purely formal. |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: We could rewrite the generalisation as For all x, ((x is a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is not black)). Instances of any one of the three disjuncts will do as confirmation. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.3) | |
A reaction: A nice clarification. |