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3 ideas
5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Explanation does not entail prediction. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 73n) | |
A reaction: Presumably the inverse of this is also true, as we might be able to predict through pure induction, without knowing why something happened. We predict that smoking is likely to cause cancer. Complex things might be explicable but unpredictable. |
14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it …is an inferential step which I propose to call 'abduction'. This will include a preference for any one hypothesis over others which would equally explain the facts. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I) | |
A reaction: I take there to be no more important function within human thought than the procedure by which we give preference to one particular explanation. It only makes sense, I think, if we take it as part of a coherence theory of justification. |
14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is of the nature of abduction to involve an original suggestion; while typical induction has no originality in it, but only tests a suggestion already made. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I) | |
A reaction: Peirce's 'abduction' is not, then, just the choice of a best explanation. He came up with the idea because he was keen to capture the creative and imaginative character of rational thought. |