display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
Full Idea: At its simplest, the problem of induction can be boiled down to the problem of justifying our belief in the uniformity of nature. | |
From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.03) | |
A reaction: An easy solution to the problem of induction: we treat the uniformity of nature as axiomatic, and then induction is all reasoning which is based on that axiom. The axiom is a working hypothesis, which may begin to appear false. Anomalies are hard. |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: 'Going together' is irrelevant as an explanation, and that is precisely why it is useless as a reason for having confidence in inductive inferences. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the deep underlying question is whether the actual world has modal features - that is, are dispositions, rather than mere categorical properties, a feature of the actual. Is this room full of possibilities? Yes, say I. |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The atomicity of Humean events ensures the sequential independence of properties, ...and this in turn leads to the Humean problem of induction. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as pretty good analysis of what has gone wrong with the Humean account. As far as I can see, the 'problem' of induction just doesn't occur in scientific essentialism. |
4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
Full Idea: The problem of induction is the problem of how an argument can be good reasoning as induction but poor reasoning as deduction. | |
From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.03) | |
A reaction: Nicely put, and a good defence of Hume against the charge that he has just muddled induction and deduction. All reasoning, we insist, should be consistent, or it isn't reasoning. |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The question about Hempel's Paradox is whether contraposition is not only equivalent in truth, but equivalent tout court. It forcibly inserts new predicates into a context of properties known to be connected by nature. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems to capture quite nicely the intuition most people have (which makes it a 'paradox') that the equivalent predicate is irrelevant to the immediate enquiry. The paradox is good because it forces the present explanation. |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: If empirical predicates are linked in clusters, contraposition of (black, raven) would carry one via such pairs as (shoe, white) into a different empirical cluster, or no cluster at all. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, addressed to Hempel's Raven Paradox. Those paradoxes now strike me as relics of a time when Humean empiricism and logic were thought to be the best approaches to scientific theory. Harré and Madden pioneered a better view. |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The generating mechanism that produces black raven-like beings is assumed in the according of potential law status to the statement that all ravens are black. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice succinct statement of what I take to be the scientific essentialist view of induction. It isn't about building up Humean habits of regularity, but of gradually inferring explanatory mechanisms, which might even give necessities. |