Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology', 'The Rationality of Science' and 'There are no ordinary things'

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6 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3858 A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
3862 All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
3863 The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
3864 Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
3865 Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not?
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
3866 If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all?
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1)