display all the ideas for this combination of texts
14 ideas
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Five attempts to describe induction are 'more of the same', the instantial model, the hypothetico-deductive model, the Bayesian approach …and causal inference. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: This interesting list totally fails to mention the best answer, which is essentialism! If you observe some instances, you only begin to think that there will be more of the same if you think you have discerned the essence. Ravens are black things! |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
Full Idea: One of the problems of the extrapolation and instantial models of confirmation is that they do not cover vertical inferences, where we infer from what we observe to something at a different level that is often unobservable. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: This is my preferred essentialist view of induction, that we don't just infer that future swans will be white, but also that whiteness is built into the biology of swans. There seems to be predictive induction and explanatory induction. |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
Full Idea: There is nothing illegitimate about giving arguments for beliefs one already holds. …So inductive justification of induction, while impotent against the skeptic, is legitimate for those who already rely on induction. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
A reaction: Not so fast! The first sentence is generally right, but if the 'beliefs one already holds' are beliefs about methods of argument, that is a different case. Compare 'this book is the word of God, because it says so in the book'. Can logic prove logic? |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
Full Idea: If an inference is inductive, then by definition it is underdetermined by the evidence and the rules of deduction. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations help with the raven paradox since, while the raven hypothesis may provide an explanation for the blackness of a particular raven, neither the original hypothesis nor its contrastive explanation explain why the shoe is white. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: For me, the examination of ravens is a search for the essence of ravenhood, which is why non-ravens don't help. Of course, if you eliminate all culprits except one, you have your culprit, but will your evidence stand up in court? |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We cannot transform a non-black non-raven into a raven to see whether we get a simultaneous transformation from non-black to black, in the way we can transform a flame without sodium into a flame with sodium. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: A white shoe would be an example of a non-black non-raven. People mesmerised by the raven paradox are too concerned with investigation being a 'logical' process. Lipton makes a nice point. We need to know the nature of ravens. |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Without something like a hypothesis about the genes of ravens, we simply do not know what would count as a relevantly similar bird for comparison. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: Lipton is endorsing the view that explanation should be 'contrastive', as well as aiming to discover the inner nature of ravens. He makes a good case for the contrastive approach. |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are considering that there is something in ravens, a gene perhaps, that makes them black, and this cause is part of the essence of ravens. Birds lacking this cause could not interbreed with ravens. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: At last, the essentialist approach to induction! Of course, it is tricky to decide a priori whether there could be albino ravens. It only takes one white (interbreeding) raven to ruin a nice essentialist story. Individuals matter. |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The reason my shoe is white is not that it lacks some feature essential to ravens that makes them black. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'The Method') | |
A reaction: Good, but not totally true. If my shoes were made to grow from genes, and then had some raven spliced into them, we might manage it. That is an explanation, but a long way from the best one. Enquiry is explanations, not deductions. |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In p(H|E) = p(E|H)p(H)/p(E), the left side is the 'posterior' probability of H given E, p(E|H) is the 'likelihood' of E given H, and the others are the 'priors' of H and E. Moving from right to left is known as 'conditionalization'. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In English, Bayes's Theorem says that there is a high confirmation when your hypothesis entails an unlikely prediction that turns out to be correct - a very plausible claim. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: Presumably the simple point is that a likely prediction could have been caused by many things, but an unlikely prediction will probably only be caused by that thing. |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations may play an important role in the actual mechanisms by which inquirers 'realize' Bayesian reasoning. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
A reaction: Lipton's strategy for making peace between IBE and Bayesians. Explanations give likeliness. The background question for Bayesians always seems to be how the initial probabilities are assigned. Pure logic won't do that job. |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Old evidence seems to provide some confirmation, but Bayesianism does not allow for this, since old evidence will have a prior probability of one, and so have no effect on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Since the Bayesian account says a hypothesis is confirmed by any of its logical consequences …it seems to inherit the over-permissiveness of the hypothetico-deductive model. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: This sounds like Hempel's Raven Paradox, where the probability of some logical consequences seems impossible to assess. |