display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
6754 | We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird] |
Full Idea: We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: An important point, and it is the job of philosophers to pull the two apart. How we talk does not necessarily show how it is. The concept of explanation is irrelevant in a universe containing no minds, or one containing only God. People seek the facts. |
6752 | The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird] |
Full Idea: There is an 'objective', non-epistemic component to explanations, consisting of the things that must exist for A to be able to explain B, and the relations those things have to one another. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: There seems to be some question-begging here, in that you have to decide what explanation you are after before you can decide which existences are of interest. There are objective facts, though, about what causally links to what. |
6750 | Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird] |
Full Idea: Explanations can be classified as causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian and functional. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: These could be subdivided, perhaps according to different types of cause. Personally, being a reductionist (like David Lewis, see Idea 3989), I suspect that all of these explanations could be reduced to causation. Essences explain causes. |
6761 | Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird] |
Full Idea: A 'contrastive explanation' explains why one thing happened but not another. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: If I explain why the ship sank, is this contrastive, or just causal, or both? Am I explaining why it sank rather than turned into a giraffe? An interesting concept, but I can't see myself making use of it. |
6758 | 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird] |
Full Idea: The fact that something fits the 'covering law' model of explanation is no guarantee that it is an explanation, for that depends on what other explanations are there to be found. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He gives Achinstein's example of a poisoned man who is run over by a bus. It has to be a basic requirement of explanations that they are the 'best', and not just something that fits a formula. |
6759 | Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird] |
Full Idea: All animals with a liver also have a heart; so we can deduce from this plus the existence of Fido's liver that he also has a heart, but his liver does not explain why he has a heart. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a counterexample to Hempel's deductive-nomological view of explanation. It seems a fairly decisive refutation of any attempt to give a simple rule for explaining things. Different types of explanation compete, and there is a subjective element. |
6756 | Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird] |
Full Idea: The probabilistic-statistical view of explanation (also called inductive-statistical explantion) is similar to deductive-nomological explanation, but instead of entailing the explanandum a probabilistic-statistical explantion makes it very likely. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: If people have umbrellas up, does that explain rain? Does the presence of a psychopath in the audience explain why I don't go to a rock concert? Still, it has a point. |
6760 | An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird] |
Full Idea: An operation for cancer might lead to a patient's death, and so it explains the patient's death while at the same time reducing the probability of death. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This attacks Hempel's 'covering law' approach. Increasing probability of something clearly does not necessarily explain it, though it often will. Feeding you contaminated food will increase the probability of your death, and may cause it. |
6785 | Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird] |
Full Idea: Explanation of a fact is some other fact or set of facts. And so Inference to the Best Explanation is inference to facts; someone who employs it cannot but take a realist attitude to a theory which is preferred on these grounds. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: So my personal commitment to abduction is entailed by my realism, and my realism is entailed by my belief in the possibility of abduction. We can't explain the properties of a table just by referring to our experiences of tables. |
6788 | Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird] |
Full Idea: It is objected to 'best explanation' that this may well not be the best of all possible worlds - so why think that the best explanation is true? Maybe bad (complicated, unsystematic and weak) explanations are true. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The only rebuttal of this objection to best explanation seems to be a priori. It would just seem an odd situation if very simple explanations fitted the facts and yet were false, like the points on a graph being a straight line by pure coincidence. |
6787 | Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird] |
Full Idea: It is objected to 'best explanation' that beauty is in the eye of the beholder - the goodness of possible explanations is subjective, and so the choice of best explanation is also subjective, and hence not a suitable guide to truth. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Explanation is indeed dependent both on the knowledge of the person involved, and on their interests. That doesn't, though, mean that you can choose any old explanation. Causal networks are features of the world. |
6751 | Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have thought that explanation is hopelessly subjective, so subjective even that it is should have no part in proper science. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: God requires no explanations, and children require many. If fundamental explanations are causal, then laying bare the causal chains is the explanation, whether you want it or not. God knows all the explanations. See Idea 6752. |