Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Probabilistic Causality', 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity' and 'Chapters on Scepticism'

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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Perhaps 'grue' has causal features, but only derivatively, in virtue of its relation to green.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III)
     A reaction: I take grue to be a behaviour, and not a property at all. The problem only arises because the notion of a 'property' became too lax. Presumably Shoemaker should also mention blue in his account.