Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'works' and 'Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


12 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle]
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle]
We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle]
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle]
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung]