Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Laws of Nature' and 'Counterparts and Identity'
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19 ideas
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
15880
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In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
12309
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There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
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11386
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Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
15869
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Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
15881
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We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
15882
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Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15888
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The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
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15887
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'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
15889
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It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
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15890
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Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
11385
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Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
11289
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Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
11246
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Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
15885
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The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11384
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We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle]
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16135
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Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle]
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16105
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We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle]
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11296
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The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle]
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11999
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Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung]
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