Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Bayesianism', 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' and 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'
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9 ideas
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
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19243
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If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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19225
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I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
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19234
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'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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19235
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How does induction get started? [Peirce]
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19236
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Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
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19251
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The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
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2799
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Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
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2798
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Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
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19222
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Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
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