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'works', 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)' and 'Introduction to 'Modality''
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31 ideas
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
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An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
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An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
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An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
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Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
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In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
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With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
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An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
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Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
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We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
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An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
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To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
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Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
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A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
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Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
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Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
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To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
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Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
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Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
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The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
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Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
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IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
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IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
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A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
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We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
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Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
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Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
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The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
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Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
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