Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Natural Kinds', 'Laws of Nature' and 'The Sublime and the Good'
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13 ideas
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
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15880
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In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
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16944
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Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
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15869
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Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
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15881
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We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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15882
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Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
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16940
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Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
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16941
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Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
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15888
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The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
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16933
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Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
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15887
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'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
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15889
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It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
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15890
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Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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15885
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The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
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