22107
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Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
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Full Idea:
Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'.
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From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
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A reaction:
This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience.
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9092
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Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
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A reaction:
Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality.
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9093
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We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
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A reaction:
This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities?
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9095
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Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
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A reaction:
The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level.
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9099
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Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2)
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A reaction:
This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary.
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