Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Events and Reification' and 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory''

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


1 idea

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Consciousness and experience of qualities are often run together - a serious mistake, I think.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvii)
     A reaction: A difficult claim to evaluate. Can we experience redness without being conscious of it? Could there be consciousness (e.g. of concepts) which didn't involve any qualities? I suspect that qualities are more basic than intentionality or consciousness.