6617
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The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy of mind seems to address the questions of whether the mind is distinct from the body, and whether the mind has properties, such as consciousness, which are unique to it.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Intro)
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A reaction:
Simple enough, but the modern debate seems to centre on the second question, which is here stated nice and clearly. Of course, wild garlic has a unique smell, but that doesn't quite qualify as a 'unique property'. Are the properties of mind unpredictable?
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5054
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Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The sequences of the brutes are but a shadow of reasoning, that is to say, they are but connexions of imagination, transitions from one image to another.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref)
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A reaction:
This account of animal thought cannot capture the fact that they are motivated by their images, and obviously make decisions based on them. Externally, there is usually an obvious reason why even an insect does something.
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6626
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'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
There is 'phenomenal' consciousness, which is what is distinctive of qualitative states of experience, and 'apperceptive' consciousness, which is awareness of all of one's mental states, including beliefs and desires.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
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A reaction:
I am not convinced that this distinction is sharp enough to be useful, though I approve of trying to analyse the components of consciousness. Is there 'intentional' consciousness? Desires, and even beliefs, can have qualities.
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12951
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Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Beasts recognise whiteness, but this does not amount to abstraction, which requires attention to the general apart from the particular, and consequently involves knowledge of universal truths.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.11)
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A reaction:
I'm not sure where 'truth' creeps into this. I might hallucinate pink elephants, and abstract the general notion of pink from them. Nevertheless, the features picked out in abstraction tend to be the shared features.
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