Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Machine Man' and 'talk'

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4 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15)
     A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A skill arises when from the many cases of thinking in experience a single general assumption is formed in connection with similar things.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a04)
     A reaction: [He gives the administration of appropriate medicine as the example of a 'skill'] Note that it is 'thinking in' experience, rather than just the raw having of experiences. This is the intellectualist version of empirical abstractionism. I like it.
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: Aristotle counts as general not only properties but also the kinds, into which objects fall, i.e. the genera, species, and differentiae of substances; and these are to be differentiated strictly from properties.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], kind) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle Intro
     A reaction: I take properties to be prior, since the kind of a thing is presumably decided by its properties. I'm increasingly thinking that 'general', 'generality' and 'generalisation' are far more useful words in philosophy than other words in that area.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A scientific subject will possess more accuracy (i.e. simplicity) the more that it is about conceptually prior and simpler things, and so it will be more accurate without than with magnitude being involved, and above all being without movement.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a10)
     A reaction: Aristotle is especially concerned to show how we can achieve accuracy, even while abstracting away from the details of the objects we are studying. Frege should have studied Aristotle more closely.