display all the ideas for this combination of texts
10 ideas
8218 | Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: The concept of the Other Person as expression of a possible world in a perceptual field leads us to consider the components of this field in a new way. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like the idea that other people are possible worlds. You can give reductionist accounts of the human animal till the cows come home, but when one walk into your visual field, the mind takes off. See Crusoe and Friday. |
4924 | A conscious human being rapidly reunifies its mind after any damage to the brain [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: It seems that after a massive stroke or surgical resection, a conscious human being is rapidly "resynthesised" or reunified within the limits of a solipsistic universe that, to outside appearances, is warped and restricted. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: Note that there are two types of 'unity of mind'. This comment refers to the unity of seeing oneself as a single person, rather than the smooth unbroken quality of conscious experience. I presume that there is no point in a mind without the first unity. |
4932 | A conscious state endures for about 100 milliseconds, known as the 'specious present' [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: The 'specious present' (William James), a rough estimate of the duration of a single conscious state, is of the order of 100 milliseconds, meaning that conscious states can change very rapidly. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: A vital feature of our subjective experience of time. I wonder what the figure is for a fly? It suggests that conscious experience really is like a movie film, composed of tiny independent 'frames' of very short duration. |
4931 | Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: Consciousness is neither a thing, nor a simple property. ..The conscious 'dynamic core' of the brain is a process, not a thing or a place, and is defined in terms of neural interactions, not in terms of neural locations, connectivity or activity. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: This must be of great interest to philosophers. Edelman is adamant that it is not any specific neurons. The nice question is: what would it be like to have your brain slowed down? Presumably we would experience steps in the process. Is he a functionalist? |
4923 | The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: The fundamental aspects of conscious experience that are common to all its phenomenological manifestations are: privateness, unity, and informativeness. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: Interesting, coming from neuroscientists. The list strikes me as rather passive. It is no use having good radar if you can't make decisions. Privacy and unity are overrated. Who gets 'informed'? Personal identity must be basic. |
4941 | Consciousness can create new axioms, but computers can't do that [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: Conscious human thought can create new axioms, which a computer cannot do. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: A nice challenge for the artificial intelligence community! I don't understand their confidence in making this assertion. Nothing in Gödel's Theorem seems to prevent the reassignment of axioms, and Quine implies that it is an easy and trivial game. |
4930 | Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: Our hypothesis is that the activity of a group of neurons can contribute directly to conscious experience if it is part of a functional cluster, characterized by strong interactions among a set of neuronal groups over a period of hundreds of milliseconds. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: This is their 'dynamic core' hypothesis. It doesn't get at the Hard Questions about consciousness, but this is a Nobel prize winner hot on the trail of the location of the action. It gives support to functionalism, because the neurons vary. |
4929 | Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: Dreaming and imagery are striking phenomenological demonstrations that the adult brain can spontaneously and intrinsically produce consciousness and meaning without any direct input from the periphery. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This offers some support for Searle's claim that brain's produce 'intrinsic' (rather than 'derived') intentionality. Of course, one can have a Humean impressions/ideas theory about how the raw material got there. We SEE meaning in our experiences. |
4940 | Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: Physicists may define information as a measure of order in a far-from-equilibrium state, but it is best seen as a biological concept which emerged in evolution with animals that were capable of mutual symbolic exchange. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: The physicists' definition seems to open the road to the possibility of non-conscious intentionality (Dennett), where the biological view seems to require consciousness of symbolic meanings (Searle). Tree-rings contain potential information? |
4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
Full Idea: The pure sensation of red is a particular neural state identified by a point within the N-dimensional neural space defined by the integrated activity of all the group of neurons that constitute the dynamic core. | |
From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This hardly answers the Hard Question (why experience it? why that experience?), but it is interesting to see a neuroscientist fishing for an account of qualia. He says three types of neuron firing generate the dimensions of the 'space'. |