display all the ideas for this combination of texts
10 ideas
| 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Although we experience objects both spatially and temporally, our consciousness itself is not experienced as spatial, though it is experienced as temporally extended. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This observation was made by Descartes. This seems to require that I experience objects spatially, AND experience my consciousness. Do I experience the time passing, as well as the river moving? Einstein says if it is in time, it must be in space. |
| 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Apparently it is just a fact of biology that organisms that have consciousness have, in general, much greater powers of discrimination than those that do not. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.III) | |
| A reaction: This presupposes knowledge of which creatures are conscious. Clearly colour vision gives more information than monochrome vision. But presumably a computer could process more visual information than I could see. It doesn't have a fovea centralis. |
| 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 7.II.7) | |
| A reaction: As it stands, this definition would fit a brain tumour. I think Searle is wrong. There is no sharp line between conscious and non-conscious brain events. Research has surely made it clear that dim brain events directly intrude into my conscious states. |
| 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
| Full Idea: There are brain processes and consciousness, but nothing in between; no rule following, information processing, unconscious inferences, mental models, language of thought or universal grammar. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch.10.II) | |
| A reaction: The core of Searle's view. He likes to call consciousness a 'property' of brains. Edelman says consciousness IS a brain process. Essentially I agree with Searle. An unusual physical object can produce consciousness, but mere 'rules' etc. cannot. |
| 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
| Full Idea: If you deny the distinction between intrinsic and derived ('as-if') intentionality, then it follows that everything in the universe has intentionality (for example, stones seem to want to fall). | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 3.IV) | |
| A reaction: Searle makes this claim because he always takes mental phenomena like intentionality or consciousness to be all-or-nothing - and he's wrong. He refuses to acknowledge non-conscious intentional states - and he's wrong again. |
| 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Water flowing downhill can be described AS IF it had intentionality: it tries to get to the bottom by seeking the line of least resistance through information processing and calculation… | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 7.II.1) | |
| A reaction: John Searle could be described as if he had intentionality, as his neurons chart their way through the information and desires that flood them. I am wary of his all-or-nothing approach to intentionality. |
| 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Intentional phenomena such as meanings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, desires, and experiences only function within a set of Background capacities that are not themselves intentional. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.I) | |
| A reaction: Why would the background not be intentional? Presumably the background is a set of beliefs about, or images of, how the world is taken to be. |
| 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Intentionality is defined in terms of representation. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.III) | |
| A reaction: Sounds okay, but representation of a tree (say) can be understood in imagistic terms, whereas extremely abstract concepts are a bit baffling. Then we realise that we conceive trees in that way as well, not as images. |
| 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
| Full Idea: I claim that only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6.I.5) | |
| A reaction: The alternative to this is that robots and lower animals might have non-conscious states which are about something, because they process useful information but are unaware of it. If so, parts of the human mind might do the same, as in blindsight. |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| Full Idea: If I am conscious of a pain, the pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.1) | |
| A reaction: Crane quotes this to challenge it. Pain may be about apparent damage to the body. Pains are certainly informative. |