1714
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Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the production of movement, perception and incorporeality.
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From:
Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 405b12)
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A reaction:
'Incorporeality' begs the question, but its appearance is a phenomenon that needs explaining. 'Movement' is an interesting Greek view. Nowadays we would presumably added intentional states, and the contents and meaning of thoughts. No 'reason'?
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5507
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Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
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Full Idea:
On the later views inspired by Aristotle's 'De Anima' there was no longer just one soul, but several, and each of them had a great deal in common with the body.
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From:
report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.17
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A reaction:
Is this based on the faculties of sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis, or is it based on the vegetative, appetitive and rational parts? The latter, I presume. Not so interesting, not so modular.
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16754
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The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The soul is the cause [aitia] of its body alike in three senses which we explicitly recognise. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, and it is (c) the essence of the whole living body.
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From:
Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b09)
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A reaction:
'Aitia' also means explanation, so these are three ways to explain a human being, by what it does, why what it is for, and by what it intrinsically is. Activity, purpose and nature.
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1717
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If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
If the soul is composed of parts of the body, or the harmony of the elements composing the body, there will be many souls, and everywhere in the body.
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From:
Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a15)
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A reaction:
We will ignore "everywhere in the body", but the rest seems to me exactly right. The idea of the unity of the soul is an understandable and convenient assumption, but it leads to all sorts of confusion. A crowd remains unified if half its members leave.
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1721
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What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
If soul has parts, what holds them together? Not body, because that is united by soul. If a thing unifies the soul, then THAT is the soul (unless it too has parts, which would lead to an infinite regress). Best to say the soul is a unity.
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From:
Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b10)
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A reaction:
You don't need a 'thing' to unify something (like a crowd). I say the body holds the soul together, not physically, but because the body's value permeates thought. The body is the focused interest of the soul, like parents kept together by their child.
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