Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Idea for a Universal History' and 'Posterior Analytics'

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3 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
     Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Primitive immediate principles ...come about from perception - as in a battle, when a rout has occurred, first one man makes a stand, then another, and then another, until a position of strength is reached.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 100a12)
     A reaction: Philosophers don't create imagery like that any more. This empiricist account of how concepts and universals are created is part of a campaign against Plato's theory of forms. [Idea 9069 continues his idea]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When one undifferentiated item in perception makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals - e.g. of man, not of Callias the man. One animal makes a stand, until animal does.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 100a15-)
     A reaction: This is the quintessential account of abstractionism, with the claim that primitive universals arise directly in perception, but only in repeated perception. How the soul does it is a mystery to Aristotle, just as associations are a mystery to Hume.