Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'Individuals in Aristotle' and 'The Emotions'

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2 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
     Full Idea: We know others' emotions by 1) understanding and explaining them, 2) emotional contagion, 3) empathy, 4) in-his-shoes imagining, and 5) sympathy.
     From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 Intro)
     A reaction: He says these must be clearly distinguished, because they are often confused. In-his-shoes is 'me in their position', where empathy is how the position is just for them. The Simulationist approach likes these two. Sympathy need not share the feelings.
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
     Full Idea: Empathy and in-his-shoes imagining are not sufficient for sympathy. Nor are they necessary. You can even sympathise with another when these are impossible, with the sufferings of a whale or a dog, for example.
     From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 'Sympathy')
     A reaction: Goldie is right that these distinct faculties are a blurred muddle in most of our accounts of dealing with other people. Empathy with a whale in not actually impossible, because we recognise their suffering, and we understand suffering.