display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
Full Idea: Except when doing philosophy there is no "problem" of other minds, because we do not hold a "hypothesis" or "belief" or "supposition" that other people are conscious. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 3.IV) | |
A reaction: Our commitment to other minds is so deep-ingrained that it is a candidate for one of Hume's 'natural beliefs', or even (a step further) for an innate idea. Babies have an innate recognition of faces, so why can't an expectation of a mind be hard-wired? |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
Full Idea: If we inferred other minds simply from behaviour, we would conclude that radios are conscious; it is rather the combination of behaviour with knowledge of the causal underpinnings of behaviour. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 1.V.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think that Searle has said the last word on the fairly uninteresting problem of other minds. Dualism generates a deep privacy problem, and analogy is a flawed argument, but best explanation is exactly what we rely on. |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
Full Idea: We experience 'horizontal unity' in the organisation of conscious experiences through short stretches of time, and 'vertical unity' in simultaneous awareness of diverse features of our experience. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6.I.2) | |
A reaction: See Betjeman's poem "On the Ninth Green at St Enedoc". The brain is an information-unification machine, and 'I' am located at the crossroads where these unifications meet. Analysis of mind is good for us, but so is reunification afterwards. |