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3 ideas
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Intentional states are mysterious things; if they are intrinsically about other things, what properties, if any, do they possess intrinsically? | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, which I suspect to be right at the heart of the tendency towards externalist accounts of the mind. Since you can only talk about the contents of the thoughts, you can't put forward a decent internalist account of what is going on. |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
Full Idea: Talk of abstraction and 'partial consideration' (Locke) does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent. In abstracting, you attend to what is there to be considered. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 05.7) | |
A reaction: Quite so. The point is to focus on aspects of reality. Does anyone seriously doubt that reality has 'aspects'? |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
Full Idea: Existing things are particular, and generality is a feature of our ways of representing the universe. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.1) | |
A reaction: This is right, and expressed with beautiful simplicity. How could anyone disagree with this? But they do! |