display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If a conscious machine were increased in size, one might enter it like a mill, but we should only see the parts impinging on one another; we should not see anything which would explain a perception. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §17) | |
A reaction: A wonderful image for capturing a widely held intuition. It seems to motivate Colin McGinn's 'Mysterianism'. The trouble is Leibniz didn't think big/small enough. Down at the level of molecules it might become obvious what a perception is. 'Might'. |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
Full Idea: Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality. | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a view with which I am sympathetic, though I am not sure if it explains anything. It would be necessary to identify a disposition of basic matter that could be built up into the disposition of a brain to think about things. |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
Full Idea: Nowadays philosophers concerned with intentionality divide into two camps. Internalists epitomise a traditional approach to thought, as intrinsic features of thinkers; externalists say it depends on contextual factors (environment or community). | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 18.2) | |
A reaction: This is basic to understanding modern debates (those that grow out of Putnam's Twin Earth). Externalism is fashionable, but I am reluctant to shake off my quaint internalism. Start by separating strict and literal meaning from speaker's meaning. |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
Full Idea: Properties of conscious experience, the so-called qualia, are not dangling appendages to material states and processes but intrinsic ingredients of those states and processes. | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to the view that qualia are intrinsic to the processes and NOT to the 'states'. Heil must be right, though. I am sure qualia are not just epiphenomena - they are too useful. |