Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Bacchae' and 'Brainchildren'

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3 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: You can't have consciousness until you have the concept of consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: If you read enough Dennett this begins to sound vaguely plausible, but next day it sounds like an absurd claim. 'You can't see a tree until you have the concept of a tree?' When do children acquire the concept of consciousness? Are apes non-conscious?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I continue to argue for a crucial role of natural language in generating the central features of consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: 'Central features' might beg the question. Dennett does doubt the consciousness of animals (1996). As I stare out of my window, his proposal seems deeply counterintuitive. How could language 'generate' consciousness? Would loss of language create zombies?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
     Full Idea: It is on the foundation of unconscious intentionality that the higher-order complexities developed that have culminated in what we call consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: Sounds right to me. Pace Searle, I have no problem with unconscious intentionality, and the general homuncular picture of low levels building up to complex high levels, which suddenly burst into the song and dance of consciousness.