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4 ideas
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century the dominant idea that causation is collisionlike made mental causation almost impossible to envision. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.136) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This makes Descartes' interaction theory look rather bold, and Leibniz's and Malebranche's rejection of it understandable. Personally I still think of causation as collisionlike, except that the collisions are of very very tiny objects. |
5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It is easy to explain why certain brain events are uniquely experienced by you subjectively: only you are properly hooked up to your own nervous system to have your own experiences. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 87) | |
A reaction: This is in reply to Nagel's oft quoted claim that mind can only be understood as "what it is like to be" that mind. I agree with Flanagan, and it is nice illustration of how philosophers can confuse themselves with high-sounding questions. |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Imagination is nothing else but sense decaying or weakened by the absence of the object. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 4.25.07) | |
A reaction: This sounds more like memory than imagination. He needs to say something about unusual combinations of memories, I would have thought. |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Hobbes' notion of 'conatus' is a 'beginning of motion' - a motion through a point of space in an instant of time. In a human subject this is experience as desire or aversion. It thus forms a bridge between physics and psychology. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], p.178) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 3 'Worlds' | |
A reaction: This sounds rather like the primitive concept of a power which I like, but the term seems to be used very vaguely, and never discussed carefully. The idea provoked Leibniz to connect physical force with mental life. |