Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Problem of the Soul', 'Meditations' and 'On Human Nature'

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2 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan]
     Full Idea: It is easy to explain why certain brain events are uniquely experienced by you subjectively: only you are properly hooked up to your own nervous system to have your own experiences.
     From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 87)
     A reaction: This is in reply to Nagel's oft quoted claim that mind can only be understood as "what it is like to be" that mind. I agree with Flanagan, and it is nice illustration of how philosophers can confuse themselves with high-sounding questions.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
     Full Idea: Descartes confined his dualism to problems of reason and language. Sensation and even imagination seemed to him physically unproblematic. Nowadays it is the reverse: thinking seems easy - but feeling?
     From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 2 n16
     A reaction: Thinking only 'seems easy' if it can be done without consciousness, and that is beginning to look like a dubious assumption. The most interesting and promising area is the borderline between a chess-playing machine and a human chess player.