display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One can assume a vegetative part of the soul in everything that receives nourishment, even in embryos; thus the excellence of this faculty is common and not confined to man; ...because of its nature it has no part in human goodness. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102a33) | |
A reaction: Presumably the excellences of this part of the soul would be strength, health and appropriate size. If plants have psuché, then neither 'soul' nor 'mind' seem very good translations. 'Vitality' seems a possibility - humans having it in a conscious form. |
5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One element of the soul is irrational but receptive to reason; it struggles and strains against reason. ...In the continent (controlled) man it is obedient to reason, and is more amenable in the virtuous man, as it is in harmony with rational principle. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b16) | |
A reaction: The very core of Aristotle's theory, with an image of psychic harmony derived from Plato (who likens in to a well-tuned musical instrument). Aristotle's merely controlled man ('enkrateia') sounds like Kant's truly moral man, following duty. |
5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That the irrational part of the psuché is in some way persuaded by reason is indicated by our use of admonition, and of reproof and encouragement of all kinds. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b33) | |
A reaction: These attempts to influence people include disapproval of people's feelings, as well as their principles, or their interpretation of the facts. This doesn't prove that feelings can be changed, but it certainly shows that we sometimes want to change them. |
5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In an irrational being the appetite for what gives it pleasure is insatiable and indiscriminate, and the exercise of the desire increases its innate tendency; and if these appetites are strong and violent, they actually drive out reason. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1119b09) | |
A reaction: The end-result of this would be a person Aristotle describes as 'brutish'. The remark seems significant because, even though man is essentially a 'rational animal' (man's 'proper function'), it is actually possible to annihilate our reason. |
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century the dominant idea that causation is collisionlike made mental causation almost impossible to envision. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.136) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This makes Descartes' interaction theory look rather bold, and Leibniz's and Malebranche's rejection of it understandable. Personally I still think of causation as collisionlike, except that the collisions are of very very tiny objects. |
5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either separate like parts of the body, or are distinguishable only in definition and thought, like the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of a circle. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102a27) | |
A reaction: Whether or not the soul is unified was a clear issue for Aristotle, explored further in De Anima (408a15 and 411b10). He appears to say the soul is not a unity, thus disagreeing with Descartes (Med. 6). |
5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It is easy to explain why certain brain events are uniquely experienced by you subjectively: only you are properly hooked up to your own nervous system to have your own experiences. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 87) | |
A reaction: This is in reply to Nagel's oft quoted claim that mind can only be understood as "what it is like to be" that mind. I agree with Flanagan, and it is nice illustration of how philosophers can confuse themselves with high-sounding questions. |