Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Being You' and 'What is it like to be a bat?'

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4 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth]
     Full Idea: It is increasingly apparent that even single neurons are capable of carrying out highly complex functions all by themselves.
     From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.1 n)
     A reaction: Bang goes the simple connectionist account of consciousness.
The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth]
     Full Idea: The cerebellum [at the back] has about four times as many neurons as the rest of the brain put together, but seems barely involved in consciousness.
     From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2)
     A reaction: I wonder if it also has four times as many connections?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
     Full Idea: An organism only has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism.
     From: Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974], p.166)
     A reaction: It is hard to argue with this, but one should push on and ask what features of its consciousness make it such that there is a 'what it is like'. What is it like to have a subconscious mind, or be deeply asleep, or drive while daydreaming?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]
     Full Idea: The main claim of Tononi's 'integrated information theory' is that a system is conscious to the extent that its whole generates more information than its parts.
     From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.3)
     A reaction: Seth seems to present this as an 'interesting' proposal. I find it unlikely that consciousness could be explain in terms of information, or that a machine constructed on this principle would thus become conscious. (Databases pass this test).