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2 ideas
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: I dispute the view that consciousness of a belief consists in some kind of belief that one has the belief. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Thus if one is trying to grasp the notion of higher-order thought, it doesn't have to be just more of same but one level up. Any sensible view of the brain would suggest that one sort of activity would lead into an entirely different sort. |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
Full Idea: Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment suggests that two thinkers can have identical qualia, despite intending different objects on Earth and Twin Earth, and hence that qualia and intentionality must be logically independent of one another. | |
From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.10 | |
A reaction: [See Idea 4099, Idea 3208, Idea 7612 for Twin Earth]. Presumably my thought of 'the smallest prime number above 10000' would be a bit thin on qualia too. Does that make them 'logically' independent? Depends what we reduce qualia or intentionality to. |