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7852
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The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau]
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Full Idea:
Anybody writing seriously about mind-brain issues nowadays needs to explain whether they think of materialism in terms of identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience.
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From:
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6)
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A reaction:
Dualists are not invited. Functionalists are attending a different party. I wonder if his four categories collapse into two: the token/supervenience view, and the identity/realization view?
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7864
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Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
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Full Idea:
Maybe physical effects of mental causes are always overdetermined by distinct causes (the 'belt and braces' view). Defenders say the two are still counterfactually dependent - but that would raise the question of why, if they are ontologically distinct.
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From:
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.5)
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A reaction:
[He cites D.H. Mellor as defending 'belt and braces'] This strikes me as the sort of theory that arises from desperation: traditional dualism won't work, but we MUST keep mind separate, so that we can have free will, and save morality. All very confused!
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7874
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Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
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Full Idea:
There is debate about whether we attribute beliefs and desires to others, and predict their behaviour, by simulating the decisions we would make ourselves ('simulation-theory'), or by deducing them from some general theory ('theory-theory').
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From:
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7)
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A reaction:
Could be both. If someone is hurt, empathy leads to direct mind-reading (which seems like simulation), but if someone is behaving strangely we may have to bring theories to bear, because this person seems to be different.
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5884
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How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
Why is it that, using the same mind, we have perception of things so utterly unlike as colour, taste, heat, smell and sound?
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xx.47)
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A reaction:
This leaves us with the 'binding problem', of how the dissimilar sensations are pulled together into one field of experience. It is a nice simple objection, though, to anyone who simplistically claims that the mind is self-evidently unified.
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5887
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The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
In souls there is no mingling of ingredients, nothing of two-fold nature, so it is impossible for the soul to be divided; impossible, therefore, for it to perish either; for perishing is like the separation of parts which were maintained in union.
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxix.71)
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A reaction:
Cicero knows he is pushing his luck in asserting that perishing is a sort of division. Why can't something be there one moment and gone the next? He appears to be in close agreement with Descartes about being a 'thinking thing'.
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7882
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Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau]
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Full Idea:
It is a mistake to suppose that research into phenomenal consciousness can proceed just like other kinds of scientific research. Phenomenal concepts are peculiar, and some of the questions they pose for empirical investigation are peculiar too.
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From:
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01)
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A reaction:
This arises from Papineau's Conceptual Dualism, that our concepts are deeply dualist, when the underlying ontology is not. Brain researchers are wise to ignore phenomenology, and creep slowly forward from the physical end, where the concepts are clear.
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