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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Thinking about Consciousness' and 'Remarks on axiomatised set theory'

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5 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind

7852	The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau]
	Full Idea: Anybody writing seriously about mind-brain issues nowadays needs to explain whether they think of materialism in terms of identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience.
	From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6)
	A reaction: Dualists are not invited. Functionalists are attending a different party. I wonder if his four categories collapse into two: the token/supervenience view, and the identity/realization view?

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation

7864	Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
	Full Idea: Maybe physical effects of mental causes are always overdetermined by distinct causes (the 'belt and braces' view). Defenders say the two are still counterfactually dependent - but that would raise the question of why, if they are ontologically distinct.
	From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.5)
	A reaction: [He cites D.H. Mellor as defending 'belt and braces'] This strikes me as the sort of theory that arises from desperation: traditional dualism won't work, but we MUST keep mind separate, so that we can have free will, and save morality. All very confused!

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds

7873	Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
	Full Idea: The classic manifestation of being able to think about other individuals' mental states is success on the 'false belief test', which requires attribution of mistaken representations to other agents. Children aged three or four can do this.
	From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7)
	A reaction: There may be an other minds problem, but there is empirical evidence that we can 'read' the minds of others (from their behaviour) even if other animals can't. That seems to be clear, even if folk psychology is fiction, and we make mistakes.

7874	Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
	Full Idea: There is debate about whether we attribute beliefs and desires to others, and predict their behaviour, by simulating the decisions we would make ourselves ('simulation-theory'), or by deducing them from some general theory ('theory-theory').
	From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7)
	A reaction: Could be both. If someone is hurt, empathy leads to direct mind-reading (which seems like simulation), but if someone is behaving strangely we may have to bring theories to bear, because this person seems to be different.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain

7882	Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau]
	Full Idea: It is a mistake to suppose that research into phenomenal consciousness can proceed just like other kinds of scientific research. Phenomenal concepts are peculiar, and some of the questions they pose for empirical investigation are peculiar too.
	From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01)
	A reaction: This arises from Papineau's Conceptual Dualism, that our concepts are deeply dualist, when the underlying ontology is not. Brain researchers are wise to ignore phenomenology, and creep slowly forward from the physical end, where the concepts are clear.