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Ideas for 'Reply to Fourth Objections', 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)' and 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]'

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2 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege]
     Full Idea: Spatial predicates are not applicable to ideas; an idea is neither to the right nor to the left of another idea; we cannot give the distances between ideas in millimetres.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §61)
     A reaction: This Fregean thought should be music to the ears of Cartesians, though it does not seem intended as support for dualism. This is the logicians' view of reality, where true inferences are what matter, and brains and souls are irrelevant.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
     Full Idea: A rational creature cannot posit itself as such a creature with self-consciousness without positing itself as an individual, as one among many rational creatures.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed] [1794], p.8), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05 n25
     A reaction: [1796 book about his Wissenschaftlehre] This is the transcendental (Kantian) approach to other minds. Wittgenstein's private language argument is similar. Hegel was impressed by this idea (I think).