Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Thinking about Consciousness' and 'Psychology from an empirical standpoint'
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10 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
7854
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Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
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7889
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Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
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7891
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We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
7890
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Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
7885
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The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
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7886
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Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
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7887
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States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
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7888
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Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3364
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All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
3225
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Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
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