Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Philosophy of Mind' and 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness''
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11 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
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9312
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Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
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9313
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Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
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9315
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Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
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9316
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How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
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9314
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Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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3367
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Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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3365
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Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
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3360
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Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
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3366
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Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
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3389
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Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
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3391
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Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
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