Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Consciousness', 'The Language of Morals' and 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness''
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
9 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9312
|
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
|
9313
|
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
|
9315
|
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
|
9316
|
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
|
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9314
|
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
|
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
6543
|
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
|
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
6537
|
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
|
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
6546
|
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
|
6547
|
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
|