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Ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'

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2 ideas

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.632)
     A reaction: Interesting. We must not confuse epistemology with ontology, but the perceived world exists between two limits - the farthest reaches of my perceptions, and the farthest reaches of myself. I wish I could clearly disentangle the nearer border. Dasein?
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Therre is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5421)
     A reaction: This seems to endorse Descartes' claim about the essential unity of the mind. I think Hume is in the background of LW's thought. Presumably the psychologist offered a 'composite' view. Prior discussion of belief leads into this remark.