display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I can express the motion of my body through the motion of a point, since its volume is not relevant, but I could not infer from this that if I know nothing except the moving force of a body, that then the body can be conceived as a simple substance. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B812/A784) | |
| A reaction: A nice analogy. The centre of gravity of a body is an abstraction, and people (such as Cartesians) who represent personal identity as being atomic seem to be discussing an abstraction rather than the real thing. My personal self is a bit of a mess. |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' xi | |
| A reaction: An illuminating idea. We are inclined to thing of reality as 'out there', and hence potentially unreachable, but we actually experience 'being reality' directly in ourselves. Is this the germ of the whole of continental philosophy? |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The 'I thinks' must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that representation would be impossible, or would be nothing to me. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B132) | |
| A reaction: This is evidently a flat rejection of Hume's claim that he is a bundle of experiences with no self to co-ordinate them. Presumably this should apply to animals too, if they 'represent' their world (and how could they not?). |
| 5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Why do we have need of a doctrine of the soul grounded merely on pure rational principles? Without doubt chiefly with the intent of securing our thinking Self from the danger of materialism. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B406-/A383) | |
| A reaction: And why is materialism a 'danger'? Only, I think, because it would make immortality impossible. Huge chunks of Enlightenment philosophy are the last vestiges of the religious view of reality. I think we can base morality on a material self. |