display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.632) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. We must not confuse epistemology with ontology, but the perceived world exists between two limits - the farthest reaches of my perceptions, and the farthest reaches of myself. I wish I could clearly disentangle the nearer border. Dasein? |
| 3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
| Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
| From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
| A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |
| 23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Therre is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5421) | |
| A reaction: This seems to endorse Descartes' claim about the essential unity of the mind. I think Hume is in the background of LW's thought. Presumably the psychologist offered a 'composite' view. Prior discussion of belief leads into this remark. |