display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Progress is when any of you turns to his own faculty of choice, working at it and perfecting it, so as to bring it fully into harmony with nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, self-respecting. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.18) | |
A reaction: [See also Disc.3.5.7] Rationality is the stoic concept of being in 'harmony with nature'. It appears (from reading Frede) that this may be the FIRST EVER reference to free will. Note the very rhetorical way in which it is presented. |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'free' will seems to have resulted from a wide extension of the idea of constraint, with global determinism lurking in the background. |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: Presumable this means that constraint is absolutely impossible, even by Zeus, and not just contingent possibility, when no one sees me raid the fridge. |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Zeus placed my good nature in my own power, and gave it to me as he has it himself, free from all hindrance, compulsion and restraint. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.03.10) | |
A reaction: Although Frede traces the origin of free will to the centrality of choice in moral life (and hence to the elevation of its importance), this remark shows that there is a religious aspect to it. Zeus is supreme, and obviously has free will. |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of the idea of free will. It is based on the accurate observation that the intrinsic privacy of a mind means that no external force can be assured of controlling its actions. Epictetus failed to think of internal forces. |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What are you saying, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg; but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the beginning of the idea of 'absolute' freedom, which is conjured up to preserve perfect inegrity and complete responsibility. Obviously you can be prevented from doing what you choose, so this is not compatibilism. |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The philosophers are right to say that if the honorable and good person knew what was going to happen, he would even collaborate with disease, death and lameness. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.05) | |
A reaction: The 'philosophers' must be the earlier stoics, founders of his school. |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: If I really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this moment, I would aspire to be so. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.06.10) | |
A reaction: The rub, of course, is that it is presumably impossible to know what is fated. Book 2.7 is on divination. I don't see any good in a mortally ill person desiring, for that reason alone, to die. Rage against the dying of the light, I say. |